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Abstract. In decision-theory, problems of self-control can be modelled as problems of intra-
personal cooperation, between a series of transient agents who each make choices at 
particular times. Early agents in the series can try to influence the actions of later agents, 
but there is no rational way to exert willpower. I show how willpower can be introduced 
into decision theory by applying the theory of team reasoning, which was originally 
developed to understand cooperation between individuals in groups and allows that there 
can be multiple levels of agency, the individual and the team. In the  case of intertemporal 
choice, the levels are the transient agent and the person over time. Intra-personal team 
reasoning, understood as a psychological process of identifying with the person over time, 
can generate a plausible theory of rational control if the intertemporal problem is 
structured as a threshold public goods game. In this framework, willpower is the ability to 
align one’s present self with one’s extended interests by identifying with the person over 
time. I show how intra-personal team reasoning creates a space for resolutions in decision 
theory and how it resolves a puzzle that exists in accounts that understand willpower as 
making and then not reconsidering resolutions.
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1. Introduction
In decision theory, a standard way of modelling a person who has to make a series of 
choices over time is as a series of transient agents, who each make choices at particular 
times. In this framework, a person has a problem of self-control when the course of action 
that is preferred by an earlier transient agent relies on a choice by a later transient agent 
that will not be preferred from that later transient agent’s point of view. Faced with such a 
problem, the earlier transient agent can try to influence the later transient agent’s 
behaviour by taking action to alter her later self’s incentives or limit her later self’s 
opportunities. However, what she cannot do is use willpower. A person who believes that 
she can simply make a plan and act on it when the time comes is considered “naive” and 
her naivety is a cause of bad outcomes. This view is in stark contrast to much research in 
psychology and philosophy, which assumes that people have willpower, and that 
exercising willpower can be rational and lead to good outcomes. 
The model also has a lacuna when it comes to agency. Problems of self-control are 
caused by conflicts between transient agents; there is no sense of an agent who has 
interests that extend over time. The transient agents may care about the outcomes of the 
other transient agents in the series, which may figure in their preference functions. 
Nevertheless each transient agent acts on its own transient interests. Related to this, the 
standard model lacks the concept of an intention that guides behaviour over time. To the 
extent that the model includes intentions, they are merely predictions of future behaviour 
that turn out to be correct. This connects back to self-control because some philosophers 
have argued that willpower consists in not revising one’s intentions (Holton, 1999).
I will show how willpower can be introduced into decision theory—and the gap 
between psychology, philosophy and economics bridged—by allowing that there can be 
multiple levels of agency and applying the theory of team reasoning. Team reasoning is an 
extension of game theory which allows that there can be multiple levels of agency 
(Sugden, 1993, Bacharach, 2006). In standard game theory, the only recognised level of  
agency is the individual, analogous to way that models of the person over time only allow 
one level of agency, the transient agent. Team reasoning was developed to understand the 
behaviour of individuals in groups. The idea is that not just individuals but also groups 
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can be agents, so that rather than asking “What should I do?”, the individuals in the group 
can ask “What should we do?”, which can solve problems of coordination and cooperation. 
Team reasoning extends game theory to allow more than one level of agency. Although the 
levels of agency in the original applications are the individual and the group, the 
conceptual apparatus can be applied to other problems. Thus, we can use the theory of 
team reasoning to introduce a second level of agency, the person over over time, into the 
model of intertemporal choice, as well as the transient agents. 
Intra-personal team reasoning can explain why it is rational to exert self-control 
without abandoning the decision theoretic framework and it can provide a basis for 
incorporating intentions into game theory. After introducing the intertemporal problem, I 
will highlight some parallels with inter-personal problems of coordination and 
cooperation, in order to motivate the use of team reasoning. Then I will introduce team 
reasoning in the inter-personal context, before showing how it can be applied to the intra-
personal case.
2. Decision Theoretic Models of the Problem of Self-Control
In decision theory, problems of intertemporal choice are often analyzed as if, at each 
time t at which the person has to make a decision, that decision is made by a distinct 
transient agent or “timeslice”, the person at time t. Each timeslice is treated as an 
independent rational decision-maker, so that “the individual over time is an infinity of 
individuals” (Strotz, 1955, p.179). This does not imply any metaphysical commitments, in 
particular it is not an endorsement of perdurantism, the view that things really do consist 
of temporal parts. Rather, it is a natural way of modelling people because the self at a 
particular time is the locus of choices, experiences, and perceptions. 
Choices are events that are located in time. Choices result in experiences and an 
experience is also a type of event, had by a person at a time or over a temporal interval. An 
experience can be pre-experienced or re-lived, through anticipation and memory; 
anticipation and memory are also types of experiences, which occur at a time, even though 
they are one step removed from the initial stimulus. 
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First person perception of events is also had by the self at a time. There is some 
evidence from psychology that, when we contemplate our experiences, as we get further 
away from the present we tend to take a third person perspective. When people are asked 
to imagine a scene from their past or their future, they are more likely to see themselves in 
the picture, rather than seeing the scene as though through their own eyes (Pronin and 
Ross, 2006). Nor are we good at predicting our future preferences and attitudes, or what 
our future experiences will feel like (Lowenthal & Loewenstein, G., 2001; Loewenstein, 
O’Donaghue, & Rabin, 2003; Van Boven, & Loewenstein, 2005). There is a gap between our 
knowledge of our current experience and our future. 
The timeslice model captures the idea that choices are made at a time, by selves that 
have a first person perspective on that time and a third person perspective on the past and 
future.
We can think of the successive selves as involved in strategic interaction or the self 
as a community of interests (Schelling, 1984; Ainslie, 1992), which gives a nice framework 
in which to set up problems of self-control in the face of temptations. Here is an example 
from a classic paper by O’Donaghue and Rabin (1999). Suppose you usually go to the 
movies on Saturday nights. The schedule for the next four weeks is as follows: week 1 is a 
mediocre movie, week 2 a good movie, week 3 a great movie, and week 4 a Johnny Depp 
movie, which is best of all. You also have a report to write for work, due within a month, 
and in order to write it you know that you will have to stay in one Saturday night and 
must therefore skip a movie. The question is: when do you complete the report?
It seems obvious that the best overall plan is to do the report on the first Saturday. 
That is the option that would be chosen by a planner who was working out your schedule 
in week 0.  But all that we need to add is a little bit of present bias, with the current 
timeslice favouring itself, for you to miss the Johnny Depp movie. In order to see this, let 
us suppose, following O’Donaghue and Rabin (1999), that the valuation of the mediocre, 
good, great, and Depp movies are 3, 5, 8, and 13 and that the cost of writing the report is 
just the cost of not seeing the movie that evening. It is plausible that each timeslice gives 
more weight to its own experiences. Imagine that each timeslice places double the weight 
on its own experiences than those of other timeslices. In that case, a naive agent, who 
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believes that she can make a plan and act on it when the time comes—even in the face of 
temptation—will end up missing the Johnny Depp movie. Come the first Saturday night 
the timeslice, call it T1, based on her current valuation, judges that she should go to the 
mediocre movie (which, with double weight, is valued at 6) and skip the good movie next 
week (valued at 5). But, next week, T2 finds herself in exactly the same situation. She 
justifies to herself why a night out is particularly valuable to her right now, so she chooses 
to go to the good movie tonight (now valued at 10), believing she has the willpower to 
skip the great movie next week (currently valued at 8). The same happens with T3, leading 
to the situation where the agent is forced to miss the Johnny Depp movie in week 4. 
There are three things to note about this example. First, the timeslice that writes the 
report bears a cost (missing the movie that week) for which others get the benefit (they get 
to go to the movie other weeks).  In economic language, there is an “externality” because 
the agent’s choice has consequences that affect other agents. Second, each timeslice 
magnifies the sacrifice that would be made by herself but does not realise that other 
timeslices will also have a “present-bias”. However, naivety about future selves is not 
essential to the problem. Even a “sophisticated” agent, who has correct expectations about 
her future present bias and backward inducts accordingly, will procrastinate for a week in 
Rabin and O’Donaghue’s model.  Third, the timeslices end up with a outcome that is 1
ranked very low by all timeslices. Missing the Depp movie is everyone but T3’s worst 
outcome, and it is T3’s second worst outcome after writing the report herself and missing 
the great movie. Conversely, apart from T1 who prefers that the report is written in week 
2, all the timeslices prefer writing the report in week 1.
 Reasoning by backwards induction: There will be no choice in week 4. If she has not 1
written the report then she will have to skip the movie. She can also predict that, if she gets 
to week 3 and has not written the report, then she will end up missing the Depp movie. 
Given that, if she gets to week 2 without having written the report, then her effective 
choice would be between missing the good movie and missing the Depp movie. According 
to the model, that’s a big enough difference in payoff that the T2 would prefer to skip the 
good movie in week 2 than have the T4 miss the Depp movie.  So if she has not written the 
report by week 2, she will write it in that week. Thus, in week 1, the choice is between 
skipping the mediocre movie in week 1 and skipping the good movie in week 2, and the 
T1 prefers to skip the good movie, so she does not write the report in week 1. Come week 
2, T2 writes the report.
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Decision theory offers two types of resources for an agent who, in week 0, wants to 
ensure that she will overcome temptation in week 1. The T0 self can change the incentives 
faced by her future selves or she can alter her opportunities (Thaler and Sheffrin, 1981; 
Greer and Levine, 2006). For example, she could enter into a side-bet with a colleague, 
which entails paying out a large sum if the report is not done in the first week, or she 
could she could rip up her week-1 cinema ticket. 
These are intended as examples of changing incentives versus destroying options, 
but there is a very fine line between the two strategies. Many pre-commitments, which 
destroy options, may actually be a way of making an option more costly: when one 
destroys an option there is usually the possibility of replacing it, albeit at some cost. In the 
previous example, the cinema ticket could presumably be replaced; even if the movie is 
sold out, there would be some price at which another ticket holder would trade.
In decision theory, a person who has a problem of self-control in the face of 
temptation faces a foreseen preference change. In the model, if we observe someone who 
does not give in to temptation, then either an earlier timeslice took action to change the 
incentives, or else she never had conflicting preferences in the first place.
3. The strange lack of self over time
Many philosophers and psychologists believe that we have another resource for 
resisting temptation: willpower. A popular idea is that willpower involves making 
“resolutions”, or plans whose purpose is to help us overcome temptation (Holton, 1999, 
2009). Decision theory has some room for plans—if they are incentive compatible i.e. if all 
the stipulated choices will maximize utility at the time of choice and therefore a decision-
maker can predict in advance that she will make them. This reduces planning to 
prediction. I will show how decision theory can make room for willpower and for plans 
that guide action.  Although my solution includes an explanation of intentions and 
resolutions, the basic capacity for self-control is intra-personal team reasoning. Therefore 
my solution explains willpower, but in a different manner from Holton’s. In fact, the 
dependency is in the other direction: we cannot make sense of resolutions within decision 
theory without adding something like my proposed mechanism of willpower. 
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I motivate my approach by noting an oddity of the standard decision theoretic 
model of the agent over time, namely the strange lack of the self over time. The transient 
agents in the O’Donaghue and Rabin (1999) model put weight on the outcomes of the 
other timeslices. Never-the-less, the preferences in the model are those of the transient 
timeslices, there is no sense in which they can hold preferences qua continuing self over 
time. Yet we usually think that people have interests that extend over time.
This way of modelling people, without extended interests or extended selves, has 
some counter-intuitive implications. We can see these very clearly using a simple example 
where the transient agents share a common goal. Take someone who wants to cross the 
road, from east to west on a two-lane city street. In order to cross the street, she must 
perform two actions in sequence. In period 1 she must walk from the east side of the street 
to the middle. Then, in period 2, she must walk from the middle to the west side. From the 
perspective of conventional decision theory, there are two transient agents, the agent in 
period 1 (T1) and the agent in period 2 (T2). Rational agents reason by backwards 
induction. So, in period 1, the agent’s reasoning (as T1) will go something like this: I can 
either stay on the east side or go to the middle. If I go to the middle, then T2 will then have 
to choose whether to go on to the west side, or to return to the east side. Since I expect T2 
to want to be on the west side, I deduce that she would go on rather than back. So, since I 
want T2 to get to the west side, I should go to the middle. T1 accordingly crosses to the 
middle of the road. Then, in period 2, T2 notes that she is in the middle of the street, and 
reasons: I would rather be on the west side than the east, so I should go to the west side. 
This type of reasoning gets the person to the other side of the street. However, it 
feels intuitively odd: the “I” in the reasoning refers to the transient timeslice, not the 
person over time. There is an absence of any sense of agency over the whole period, of a 
continuing self who has interests that extend over the whole period and who can form an 
intention to cross the street and then just carry it out. In period 1 our agent can predict that 
she will continue the action in period 2. However, in neither period can she think of herself 
as performing the action of crossing the street; she cannot perceive herself as a continuing 
agent, nor act on her intentions qua continuing agent.
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A standard decision theorist might counter that she would not usually model 
crossing the street in this manner. Decision theory is flexible about the length of time for 
which a transient agent exists. It is not committed to the fleeting timeslices found in 
metaphysics. One would not usually model separate transient agents when the transient 
agents’ interests are aligned because this situation does not usually present an interesting 
problem. There are two replies to this. 
The first is that the timeslice modelling strategy is not merely confined to situations 
of conflict of interests, people have modelled transient agents whose interests are aligned. 
Even when interests are aligned, there are interesting and perplexing issues. In particular, 
decision theory cannot necessarily predict that transient agents will coordinate over time 
in sequential coordination games (Binmore, 1987; Pettit and Sugden, 1989; Reny, 1992; 
Gold and Sugden, 2006).
 The second response is that the decision theorist is still missing something 
interesting. The intra-personal coordination example was supposed to show how the 
model does violence to our intuitions by not acknowledging agency over time. However, it 
is not critical to view intra-personal coordination as a problem in order to think we need to 
supplement the standard model in the case of self-control. For the decision theorist, there 
is a problem of self-control when interests conflict, but no problem when they are aligned. 
The standard phenomenology of temptation involves feeling conflicted between long- and 
short-term interests, and a natural way to think of self-control is the ability to align one’s 
short- and long-term interests. Decision theory does not include this conflict, nor does it 
explain how some agents can resolve it without the use of external crutches. Standard 
decision theory has nothing to say about why preferences are sometimes aligned and other 
times they are not. 
 Decision theory provides a neat model of lack of self-control, but has a lacuna when 
it comes to self-control. The crucial feature in the decision theoretic model of self-control is 
a temporary and anticipated preference change. In order to exhibit self-control, an agent 
must bring her future preferences into line. In the model, this can only be done by 
changing the environment. What the model lacks is an internal mechanism by which an 
agent can bring her preferences into line, or an explanation why, absent external 
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mechanisms, one agent can exercise self-control in the face of temptation when another 
agent cannot.
4. Inter-personal Team Reasoning
While the transient agent model does very well at capturing the conflict of interests 
between timeslices that can lead to problems of self-control, it does not capture our sense 
of agency over time or the role of willpower, in the sense described in philosophy and 
psychology. In order to capture agency over time and willpower without losing the 
insights of the transient agent model, we can introduce another level of agency, the person 
over time, as well as the level of the transient agents. In other words, we need a model of 
multiple levels of agency. Luckily, such a model already exists in the inter-personal case, 
which we can apply to our problem.
The theory of team reasoning was motivated by two families of game that have 
counter-intuitive solutions (Colman & Gold, 2017, Karpus & Gold, 2017). One family of 
games has multiple Nash equilibria, but one of the equilibria Pareto dominates the others—
there is one outcome in which all players are better off—yet game theory cannot 
recommend or predict the strategies that lead to the Pareto-dominant outcome. All 
classical game theory can say is that the rational solution will be one of the Nash 
equilibria. One member of this family is the coordination game known as Hi-Lo, shown in 
Figure 1, another is the Stag Hunt. We can illustrate the problem using the Hi-Lo game. 
Standard game theory says that a rational player will choose a best reply to the other 
player(s). If P1 chooses high, then the best response by P2 is also to choose high, so (high, 
high) is a Nash equilibrium. However, if P1 were to choose low, then the best responses by 
P2 is to choose low as well; if P1 chooses low and P2 chooses high then both get nothing. 
Therefore (low, low) is also a Nash equilibrium. Standard game theory recommends that 
rational players will play their parts in a Nash equilibrium, but it cannot advise one Nash 




P1 high 2, 2 0, 0
low 0, 0 1, 1 
Figure 1:  Hi-Lo game
The second family of games is those with a single Nash equilibrium that is Pareto 
dominated by a non-equilibrium outcome. In this case, game theory would recommend 
and predict that the strategies leading to the non-equilibrium outcome will not be played. 
An example of this type of game is the infamous prisoner’s dilemma, or its multi-player 
version, the public goods game.
Team reasoning can explain why it is rational for individual players to choose the 
strategies that lead to the Pareto-dominant outcomes. The idea is that, when an individual 
identifies with and reasons as a member of a team, she considers which combination of 
actions by members of the team would best promote the team’s objective and then 
performs her part of that combination.  Instead of asking “What should I do?” as per 
classical game theory, players can ask, “What should we do and how can I play my part?”. 
It is clear that, if there is common knowledge that all players group identify and are team 
reasoning, the theory of team reasoning can recommend and predict high-play in Hi-Lo. In 
the prisoner’s dilemma, if the off-diagonal outcomes are viewed as worse than the (C, C) 
outcomes from the perspective of the team, then with common knowledge of team 
reasoning the theory can predict and recommend C-play. (For a more detailed explanation 
see Gold & Sugden, 2007a, Gold & Sugden, 2007b.)
Team reasoning involves both a payoff-transformation, to what Sugden (1993) calls 
“team-directed preferences”, and an agency transformation, taking the relevant unit of 
agency to be the group. In behavioural economics, theorists often start with the material 
payoffs that subjects face and talk of their transformation into the utility payoffs that guide 
behaviour, which may diverge from their material payoffs (for instance if they care about 
what the other player gets). In the theory of team reasoning, we start with the utility 
payoffs that represent what the player wants to achieve as an individual and, when an 
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individual group identifies, the payoff transformation is to the payoffs that the player 
wants to achieve as a team member (Gold, 2012). Payoff transformation alone will not 
suffice, the agency transformation is a necessary part of the process. To see why, consider 
what would happen if we only had payoff transformation. No plausible payoff-
transformation will change the ordering of the payoffs in Hi-Lo, where interests are 
already aligned. (See Karpus & Gold, 2017 or Colman & Gold, 2017 for a more extended 
explanation.) In the prisoner’s dilemma, payoff transformation theories usually turn the 
(C, C) outcome into an equilibrium, but they do not change the equilibrium status of the 
(D, D) outcome, so they still cannot predict cooperative choices (Gold, 2012, provides more 
detail). In order to see this, take the prisoner’s dilemma on the left-hand side of Figure 2. 
Transforming the game using golden mean altruism, where each player is motivated to 
maximize the average of the player’s outcomes, gives the matrix on the right-hand side of 
Figure 2, which is a Hi-Lo. (See also Gold & Sugden, 2007a, Gold & Sugden 2007b.)
P2 P2
C D C D
P1 C 4, 4 0, 5 P1 C 4, 4 2.5, 2.5
D 5, 0 3, 3 D 2.5, 2.5 3, 3 
Figure 2:  Prisoner’s Dilemma and Prisoner’s Dilemma transformed
Team reasoning was developed separately by Bacharach (1997, 1999, 2006) and 
Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003), and they have different explanations about when and why team 
reasoning occurs. Both Bacharach and Sugden’s theories involve framing and expectations, 
but Bacharach’s emphasis is on framing while Sugden’s is on expectations. 
For Bacharach, team reasoning is a psychological process. Whether or not someone 
team reasons simply depends on whether she “frames” the game as a problem for “me” or 
a problem for “us”. In an unreliable team interaction, there is some doubt as to whether other 
team members group identify and team reason. When deciding what to do, someone who 
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team reasons will use circumspect team reasoning, taking into account the probability that 
other players team reason and maximizing expected utility from the perspective of the 
team. For instance, in the prisoner’s dilemma, cooperating may not maximize the team 
utility if there is a large enough chance that other player does not team reason, so 
circumspect team reasoning does not lead to unconditional cooperation. However, for 
Bacharach, team reasoning does not follow from rationally accessible deliberation and 
team reasoning may leave the individual worse off in terms of her individual lights, for 
instance if the team were to rank the off-diagonal (C, D)  and (D, C) outcomes of the 
prisoner’s dilemma higher than the (C, C) outcome, or if circumspect team reasoning 
recommends that C-play would maximize expected utility ex ante, but ex poste the other 
player turns out not to have group identified. 
For Sugden, team reasoning is a part of a social contract theory, where an individual 
can choose to cooperate with others for mutual advantage (Sugden, 2011, 2015). If an 
individual sees that it is possible to frame a game as a problem for “us”, then she may 
decide to team reason. However, no individual would team reason unless it furthered her 
individual interests, which puts constraints on the team payoff ordering. Sugden’s team 
reasoners will not risk getting suckered, which also means that they will not team reason 
without assurance that others are team reasoning too, hence we can call it mutually assured 
team reasoning. The idea that people can decide to team reason, the constraints on the team 
preferences, and the need for assurance are all points of difference with Bacharach’s 
theory. (See Gold, 2012, for more detailed comparison.)
5. Intra-personal team reasoning
Problems of self-control are problems of intra-personal cooperation (Gold, 2013). 
The classic inter-personal problem of cooperation is the prisoner’s dilemma, a type of 
public goods game, where costly actions by individuals have positive externalities, so that it 
is individually rational for an individual to defect (not to contribute to the public good), 
even though all individuals prefer the situation where everyone contributes to the one 
where no-one contributes. In other words, one agent takes an action whose benefits are 
spread across many agents. The benefit that accrues to the individual does not outweigh 
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the cost of the action, but the benefit that accrues across all individuals does. Problems of 
self-control are similar in that they involve one transient agent paying a cost in return for 
benefits that accrue to other transient agents, so they are problems of intra-personal 
cooperation. 
By analogy, if inter-personal team reasoning can lead to cooperation in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, then intra-personal team reasoning can promote self-control. In the 
intra-personal case, the team consists of the set of timeslices that make up the person over 
time. The units of agency are the timeslice and the self-over time, and the equivalent of 
group identification is identifying with the person over time. In the standard model, the 
timeslice does “transient-agent reasoning”, asking “What should I-now do?”, whereas 
intra-personal team reasoning allows any timeslice that identifies with the person over 
time to ask “What should the I-the person over time do?” and to play its part in the best 
team plan. 
Take the problem of Jo’s examination, introduced by Gold and Sugden (2006). This 
is a three period model, with three transient agents, Jo1, Jo2, and Jo3. In period 3, Jo takes an 
examination, in periods 1 and 2, Jo must decide whether to study for the exam or to relax. 
The experienced utility (in the sense of Kahneman and Thaler, 2006) of studying in any 
period is –3, while that of resting is 0.  In period 3, experienced utility is 0 if Jo has rested 
on both previous days, 5 if she has rested on one day and studied on the other, and 10 if 
she has studied on both. In terms of experienced utility, if either Jo1 or Jo2 chooses to study, 
then that timeslice bears a cost that has benefits for Jo3. The benefits of studying are greater 
over the lifetime than the costs. However, the transient agents that study do not capture 




Jo1 study –3, –3, 10 –3, 0, 5
rest –3, 0, 5 0, 0, 0  
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Figure 3:  Jo’s examination, experienced utility payoffs for Jo1, Jo2 and Jo3
Jo2
study rest
Jo1 study 1, 1, 14 –1, 2, 7
rest 2, –1, 7 0, 0, 0  
Figure 4:  Jo’s examination, payoffs in lifetime utility for Jo1, Jo2 and Jo3; lifetime 
utility for player i is the sum of the experienced utlities of all other players plus 
two times the experienced utility of player i, representing the timeslice’s double 
weighting of its own outcomes
Even if each transient agent cares about the others, a little bit of present bias can still 
lead to a problem of self-control. Imagine that, as in the O’Donaghue and Rabin (1999) 
model above, each transient agent values the experiences of all transient agents, but places 
double the weight on its own experiences as those of other timeslices. Figure 4 shows the 
payoffs in terms of these preferences over the lifetime. Now some of the benefits of 
studying accrue to the transient agent who studies (because the payoffs of the other 
transient agents are in her utility function), but there is still an externality and the costs of 
studying still outweigh the benefits for each individual transient agent. In this lifetime 
preference model, Jo1 and Jo2 are playing a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. The dominant 
strategy is rest, but every transient agent prefers the outcome of (study, study) to those of 
(rest, rest). By backwards induction reasoning, Jo1 can predict that Jo2 will choose rest. So 
Jo1’s choice is effectively between the sequences (study, rest) and (rest, rest);  (rest, rest) is 
superior from her point of view, so according to decision theory she should choose rest.   
However, if we allow that each transient agent can ask “What should I-the person 
over time do?”, then  it may be possible to achieve the outcome (study, study). Intra-
personal team reasoning can solve the intra-personal problem of cooperation in the same 
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way that inter-personal team reasoning solves the inter-personal problem. Intra-personal 
team reasoning could proceed according to either of Sugden’s or Bacharach’s theories. 
In the game in terms of lifetime utilities (Figure 4), there is an opportunity for 
mutual benefit, so we can apply Sugden’s mutually assured team reasoning. If Jo1 has 
reason to believe that Jo2 will identify with the team of the person over time and will 
endorse mutually assured intra-personal team reasoning, then if  Jo1 also endorses 
mutually assured intra-personal team reasoning, she can choose to study. This captures our 
intuition that starting a plan that will require a series of sacrifices, such as a study plan or a 
diet, requires the belief that our later self will follow through. 
However, we might wonder whether mutually assured team reasoning is the right 
framework for thinking about the self over time. It is built on ideas of reciprocity and the 
social contract, which do not seem to apply in the case of the self over time. The lifetime 
utility is constructed from the timeslices’ preferences, with the transient agents 
compromising on their timeslice preference satisfaction. As well as the basic implausibility 
of this approach, we might also worry that it introduces an element of double counting 
into the goals of the person over time. In the realm of social contract theory, Dworkin 
(1977) distinguished “personal preferences”, which are wholly about oneself, and 
“external preferences”, which are about other people. He argues that people’s external 
preferences should not influence the assignment of goods. In the intra-personal case, if Jo1 
is positively disposed towards Jo2 and wants her to have good outcomes and, as well as 
allowing Jo2’s personal preferences to influence what the team seeks to achieve we also 
take into account Jo1’s external preference, then we have double counted Jo2’s outcomes.
We can also apply Bacharach’s circumspect team reasoning, since Jo1 has to make 
her choice before she knows for sure whether Jo2 will group identify and team reason. In 
the Bacharach framework, there is no particular reason to think that the lifetime utility 
function is based on each transient agent’s lifetime preferences rather than on each 
transient agent’s outcomes. As a simplification, let us assume that the lifetime function is 
achieved by aggregating the transient agents’ experienced utility. However, in that case, as 
this stands, the model would lead to unconditional cooperation (self-control) by any 
timeslice who team reasons. That is guaranteed by the externality structure of the problem: 
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the cost born by the timeslice is always outweighed by the benefits to the set of timeslices, 
so study will always be better for the team regardless of whether the other timeslices group 
identify. In fact, we might even wonder why we need team reasoning. If a timeslice simply 
takes the aggregated utility of all timeslices as their end, that would suffice to get them to 
exercise self-control. So this model both violates the intuition that an person will not 
usually start on a plan unless she expects her later selves to follow through and obviates 
the need for team reasoning.
We can re-introduce an element of conditional cooperation and, with it, a need for 
team reasoning if we turn the examination problem into a threshold case. A threshold public 
good does not have a linear relationship between costs and benefits. Rather, the good is 
provided if and only if contributions pass a minimum threshold. As applied to the 
problem of Jo’s examination, imagine that the exam is pass-fail and Jo needs to study both 
days in order to pass. The only change we need make to the original problem is in period 
3, where experienced utility is 0 unless Jo has worked on both previous days, in which 
case it is 10. Now the outcome matrix in experienced utilities is as in Figure 5 and the 
aggregated outcomes when both players view the problem from the perspective of the 
intra-personal team are in Figure 6. From the perspective of the team, this is a Hi-Lo game. 
We can see that (study, study) gives better outcomes for the team than (rest, rest), but either 
of these is better than the outcome where one timeslice works and the other rests. 
Therefore, if Jo1 group identifies and team reasons, then what she should do depends on 
whether or not she expects Jo2 to group identify. If she expects that Jo2 will also team 
reason then she should choose study, but if she expects that Jo2 will not team reason, and 
will therefore choose the individually dominant strategy of rest, Jo1 should rest herself. 
Whether or not a team reasoning transient agent will exercise self-control will depend on 




Jo1 study -3, -3, 10 –3, 0, 0
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rest 0, -3, 0 0, 0, 0  




Jo1 study 4, 4, 4 -3, -3, -3
rest -3, -3, -3 0, 0, 0
Figure 6:  Jo’s examination threshold case, when both players view the problem from the 
perspective of the intra-personal team and aggregate the transient agents’ experienced 
utilities to obtain the team payoffs
It is not difficult to work out when a team reasoning Jo1 will choose study. We know 
that if Jo1 does not study, then the best response by Jo2 will be rest from both the 
perspective of the timeslice and that of the team over time: choosing rest is the 
unconditional best response from the perspective of the timeslice and it is the best 
response for a team reasoning Jo2 if Jo1 has chosen rest. Remembering that a team 
reasoning Jo1 will maximise the payoff of the team and assigning 0 < p <  1 as the 
probability that Jo2 will group identify and Ut as the team payoff function, then Jo2 will 
study if:
expected team payoff if Jo1 chooses study > expected team payoff if Jo1 chooses rest
=> p(Jo2 chooses study).Ut(study, study) + p(Jo2 chooses rest). Ut(study, rest)> Ut(rest, rest) 
=> 4p - 3(1-p) > 0
=> 7p > 3
=> p > 3/7
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Therefore Bacharach-style intra-personal team reasoning, understood as a 
psychological process of identifying with the person over time, can generate a plausible 
theory of rational self control (one that is conditional on what later timeslices are expected 
to do) if the structure of the intra-personal problem is a threshold public goods game. It is 
not implausible to think that problems of self-control, as viewed by the person involved, 
have this threshold structure.  Although most self-control problems have an underlying 
continuous public goods game structure, we may have a tendency to turn them into 
threshold cases. Most self-control problems have continuous but imperceptible benefits. 
Think of smoking, where every cigarette has a very small negative effect on the smoker’s 
health, or dieting, where every calorie that the dieter forgoes consuming puts her nearer to 
fitting into that dress. However, when we forgo these temptations, we are looking for 
perceptible benefits. The smoker wants to feel healthier, the dieter wants to lose a kilo or to 
fit into a dress. These perceptible benefits fix a threshold—albeit one that is vague—the 
number of cigarettes or calories forgone to make a perceptible difference. If the person is 
aiming for a perceptible difference, then there is no point an earlier self forgoing the first 
cigarette or the first dessert unless she expects enough of the later timeslices to continue 
the good work.
Of course, the theory of intra-personal team reasoning needs to be supplemented 
with an account of how timeslices come to identify with the person over time. This is not 
the place to develop one, but here is a sketch. (I say more about it elsewhere, in Gold, 
unpublished; Gold,& Kyratsous, 2017). Again we can make an analogy to the inter-
personal case. In psychology, there is a body of research about how individuals come to 
identify with groups. The mechanisms of group identification fit into two broad categories: 
recognising that the group members have some sort of shared goal or common fate, and 
recognising commonalities or similarities between the individuals within the group. Both 
of these could apply to the intra-personal case. 
Timeslices may identify with the person over time because they recognise that they 
all share long-term interests. As Korsgaard (1989) argues, there is a sense in which 
timeslices are one continuing person because they have one life to lead. Her arguments are 
normative, but a psychological and phenomenological analogue can be found in the work 
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of James (1890), where one source of a sense of self over time is the recognition that a self 
in the past or the future was or will be part of the same person. Therefore we might 
speculate that increasing the salience of the shared interests of the timeslices, or their long-
term goals, will facilitate this sense of identification. 
Alternatively, timeslices might identify with the person over time because they 
realise that they are either similar to or connected to the other timeslices. James (1890) also 
thought that that the current self’s perception that it is similar to proximate selves gives 
rise to a sense that it is continuous with those proximate selves. Psychologists have found 
that subjects who rated themselves as more connected to later selves, in the sense of Parfit 
(1984), were more patient (Bartels & Rips, 2010) and that connectedness can be 
manipulated, resulting in increased patience (Bartels & Urminsky, 2011). Accordingly, 
increased salience of either similarities or  connectedness between the timeslices may 
facilitate identification with the person over time.
Decision theory provides a model of instrumental rationality, where decision-
makers take the best means to their ends. Instrumental rationality presupposes that the 
decision-maker has a set of ends. Therefore, the timeslice has to identify with a level of 
agency, and take on a set of ends, before instrumental reasoning can begin. However, 
decision theory has nothing to say about phenomenology. It is consistent with this picture 
that the timeslice experiences a tension between between the transient-agent preferences 
and the self-over-time preferences, so the model is compatible with the phenomenology of 
conflict. 
6. Willpower, decision theory, and intentions
Intra-personal team reasoning sheds fresh light on willpower. In the model, 
willpower is the ability to align one’s present self with one’s extended interests by 
identifying with one’s self over time. This picture of willpower differs from the idea of 
Holton (1999, 2009), that strength of will consists in not reconsidering one’s resolutions. 
But it does create a space for resolutions in decision theory and resolves a puzzle about 
resolutions that we find in Holton’s account.
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Standard decision theory does not have room for intentions—understood as 
motivating plans— or for resolutions that are designed to fortify us against contrary 
inclinations later on. In O’Donaghue and Rabin’s (1999) model, the naive agent who forms 
a plan in T0 to write the report in T1 will not carry out the plan and ends up missing the 
Depp movie. Part of her problem was that she did not take into account the preferences 
that her T1 self would have. A sophisticated agent would correctly predict her future 
present bias and her T0 self would be able to plan to do the report in T2. However, this is 
simply a correct prediction of her future behaviour. If prediction is all that planning 
consists of, then we do not need a separate concept of a “plan” and there is no need for 
intentions because we can suffice with beliefs. Further, the hyper-rational agents of 
standard economics can make optimal decisions in a flash; they can make them whenever 
and how ever many times as they want, so there is no need to make them in advance and 
form the intention to act on the decision later.
Decision theory can make room for intentions by appealing to the idea of bounded 
rationality. If it takes time for a boundedly-rational agent to make a decision, then it may 
not be best for the agent to take the decision at the time of action. Once the person has 
made a decision then, other things being equal, she should not waste her limited time by 
re-opening the question. Hence, it might be optimal for the agent to make the decision in 
advance and form an intention as a reminder of her decision, which she can consult at the 
time of action.
However, the idea of a resolution fits uncomfortably in this framework. Remember 
that agency sits with timeslices. Effectively, the past timeslice takes a decision and, other 
things being equal, the future timeslice does not re-open the question. (If decision making 
is onerous, then there may also be a problem of procrastination about making the decision, 
but we leave that aside here.) One part of “other things being equal” is the idea that the 
later timeslice would be likely to make the same decision as previously, so re-deliberating 
is a waste of time. This seems uncontroversial in cases where there is no conflict of 
interests between timeslices. However, Holton’s (1999, 2009) resolutions are formed in 
order to defeat contrary inclinations, which will arise at the time of action. In the decision 
theoretic framework, the past timeslice is making a decision that she knows the future 
!20
timeslice will not want to carry out, if the future timeslice takes the standard timeslice 
perspective. Therefore, if a timeslice remembers that an earlier timeslice made a resolution, 
she also has reason to think that the resolution conflicts with her current timeslice-
preferences, so if she is thinking as a timeslice then she should abandon any prior 
resolutions. (This relates to Hinchman’s 1993 idea that diachronic agency involves a type 
of self-trust.)
If the timeslice is to act on resolutions, then we need to add something extra and 
intra-personal team reasoning can supply the missing piece of the puzzle. In the 
framework of the person as a team over time, an intention is a plan made by an earlier 
timeslice who identifies as a member of the team over time. The intention has two different 
purposes. Firstly, it is a contingency plan, for later timeslices who turn out to identify with 
the person over time and therefore share the team preferences of the planner. There is no 
conflict of interest and, if the later timeslice has no reason to suspect that the earlier 
planning timeslice made a bad plan, then she can simply follow her part of the plan. Intra-
personal team reasoning can explain how the different timeslices’ interests are aligned so 
that the later timeslice knows that she should follow the plan made by the earlier one.
Planning can also play a second type of role in this picture. In the same way that 
standard decision theory allows earlier timeslices to take actions to constrain later 
timeslices, in the theory of intra-personal team reasoning the earlier timeslice can take 
actions that increase the probability of group identification by later ones. Remembering a 
plan may encourage the timeslice that does the remembering to identify with the person 
over time. For instance, it makes salient the existence of the temporally extended agent 
and the shared extended interests of the timeslices. 
In this second role, making a plan may have some of the effects of Holton’s (1999, 
2009) resolutions. By encouraging the later timeslice to identify with the person over time 
and therefore to act on the plan, it may prevent the transient-agent reasoning that leads to 
weakness of will. Therefore resolutions are a mechanism of self-control. Nevertheless, in 
the model of intra-personal team reasoning, the resolution is not the root cause of self-
control. The fact that the plan can be effective in the face of contrary inclinations is 
parasitic on the idea that the timeslice can identify with the self over time and do intra-
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personal team reasoning. If, at the time of action, the timeslice did some reasoning then 
she could come to the same decision as previously, provided that she does  intra-personal 
team reasoning rather than transient-agent reasoning. Further, an agent who makes a 
resolution but then happens to reconsider at time of action is not totally lost (so intra-
personal team reasoning solves a problem posed by Bratman, 2014, about how an agent 
can rationally form an intention if she anticipates that she will re-open the question and 
take a transient-agent view at the time of action). It is not a foregone conclusion that the 
later timeslice will do transient-agent reasoning rather than intra-personal team reasoning.
We can also compare willpower as resolutions to willpower as intra-personal team 
reasoning using the philosophical framework of synchronic versus diachronic self-control 
(Mele, 1987). Diachronic self-control occurs when an agent anticipates a preference change 
and takes action to prevent herself from succumbing later, synchronic self-control occurs 
when the agent exercises self-control at the very same time as experiencing a temptation. 
Intentions can be a means of diachronic self-control in both the resolution and the intra-
personal team reasoning accounts. In the resolutions account, this is because not re-
considering one’s resolution is the instrument of synchronic self-control. In the intra-
personal team reasoning account, an agent who identifies with the person over time might 
not re-consider her intentions. However, the ultimate instrument of synchronic self-
control, which also underpins the intention or resolution, is intra-personal team reasoning. 
If an agent forms a resolution, it is effective because it prompts identification with the 
person over time and, hence, acting on the results of intra-personal team reasoning.
7. Conclusion
I have presented a picture of willpower as intra-personal team reasoning, analogous 
to using inter-personal team reasoning to solve problems of cooperation between 
individuals. I suggested that we should model problems of self-control as threshold public 
goods games. I have shown how, although the timeslices’ transient-agent preferences are 
in conflict, it is possible for them to identify with the person over time and use circumspect 
intra-personal team reasoning in order to resolve their problem of self-control. Intra-
personal team reasoning also provides a basis for introducing intentions and resolutions 
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into decision theory, although at base it is intra-personal team reasoning that solves the 
synchronic problem of self-control and which gives resolutions their power. 
I have shown how willpower can be instrumentally rational for the person over 
time, even while succumbing to temptation is instrumentally rational from the perspective 
of the timeslice. In this sense, the model provides an answer to the longstanding 
philosophical question of how an individual can intentionally act against what she judges 
to be best. Many people have the intuition that the timeslice is doing something wrong if 
she succumbs to temptation. It follows from what I have said here that the wrongness is 
not derived from instrumental rationality. There is a lot more to be said about why 
timeslices should identify with the self over time and when they will do so (Gold, 
unpublished). But this is an issue for a whole separate paper.
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